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INTRODUCTION 
June 28, 2013 marks the twentieth anniversary of Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 I am a fan and have been one since it was 
decided.2 Although the impact of Daubert on trial court practice has 
been heartily debated, I firmly believe that the decision was 
revolutionary, though many of its far-reaching effects have yet to be 
felt.3 But that is the nature of revolutions: they cannot be fully 
measured when in the midst of them, nor can their future 
consequences be predicted with precision. When asked about the 
French Revolution in 1973, Zhou Enlai reputedly stated that it 
remained “too early to say.”4 This Essay, then, stands as something of 
an ongoing assessment. Twenty years of experience with Daubert gives 
 
 1 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2 Indeed, I advocated the basic approach the Court adopted in Daubert in an 
article published four years prior to that decision. See David L. Faigman, To Have and 
Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 
EMORY L.J. 1005, 1009-10 (1989) (“The legal relevance of social science findings 
should depend on their scientific strength, that is, on the ability of social scientists to 
answer validly the questions posed to them.”). But, alas, the idea of basing the 
admissibility of scientific evidence on scientific merit (as opposed to its general 
acceptance in the pertinent field) was promulgated by others before me, most notably 
including another participant in this Symposium, Bert Black. See Bert Black, A Unified 
Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 599 (1988) (proposing “a 
theoretical framework based on distinguishing two aspects of relevancy: (1) the 
validity of the reasoning leading to a conclusion, and (2) the reliability of the 
conclusion”) (emphasis in original); see also Andre Moenssens, Admissibility of 
Scientific Evidence — An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 567-
74 (1984) (proposing a process by which scientific evidence would be evaluated on 
the basis of its “reliability for a specific purpose”). 
 3 Thirteen years ago I had the opportunity to write on the occasion of Daubert’s 
seventh anniversary and there described it as a revolutionary event. See David L. 
Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on the Law’s Use 
of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661, 661 (2000). 
That revolution has been more chaotic and has taken longer to solidify than I 
expected. I suspect that in ten years, on the occasion of Daubert’s thirtieth anniversary, 
I will still be at least somewhat dissatisfied with what progress has been made. But I 
look forward to writing on that occasion as well. It’s worth noting, finally, that others 
have also described Daubert as constituting a paradigm shift or, in other words, 
revolutionary. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift 
in Forensic Identification, 309 SCIENCE 892, 892 n.9 (2005). 
 4 There is considerable debate regarding whether this oft-quoted wisdom is an 
accurate depiction of Zhou Enlai’s response to the question of the French Revolution’s 
legacy. Rather than referring to the Revolution of 1789, which gives the quotation so 
much resonance, some have suggested that the former premier was referring to the 
student revolts of 1968, making the observation rather less profound. See Richard 
McGregor, Zhou’s cryptic caution lost in translation, FIN. TIMES, June 10, 2011, http://www. 
ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/74916db6-938d-11e0-922e-00144feab49a.html#axzz2AWSChjFi. 
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us much to consider and some outlines of the Daubert revolution can, 
at least, be identified, while others remain inchoate. 
Use of the revolutionary metaphor, however, creates a certain 
ambiguity, especially in the context of scientific evidence. There are at 
least two different archetypes of “revolutions” that might be meant by 
the metaphor in this context. The most obvious, perhaps, is the 
scientific revolution, which largely was sparked in the sixteenth 
century, gained traction in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
and continues to hold sway today.5 Although the scientific revolution 
changed much in society, it was first and foremost an intellectual 
revolution. The second kind of revolution, suggested by the allusion to 
the French Revolution above, is a social or political revolution. While 
these two kinds of revolutions are both very real, they are also fairly 
distinct. The scientific revolution was an intellectual revolution that 
resulted in a fundamental change in reasoning — that is, in gathering 
information about the world in which we live. Although the scientific 
revolution had political consequences, political change was not its 
driving premise. In contrast, political revolutions — such as the 
French Revolution — are driven by the desire for social change, 
though they, too, are likely to be accompanied by fundamental 
changes in reasoning or perspective. It might be said, then, that 
whereas political revolutions have social change as their driving 
premises and changed ideas as a consequence, intellectual revolutions 
have changed ideas as their driving premises and social change as a 
consequence. 
Of course, the reality of revolutionary events is never as clean as the 
archetypes might suggest. There is much smoke and many mirrors in 
coming to understand any revolutionary event. So, too, is this true for 
the Court’s expert evidence jurisprudence. Daubert began as a 
relatively modest political revolution, but in the long-term is likely to 
be known for the intellectual transformation it imposed on the law. At 
least, that is the basic premise of this Essay. Daubert and its progeny 
are best understood as originally intended to give trial courts 
expanded managerial powers over expert testimony and, thus, the trial 
process more generally. By employing the scientific sensibilities 
necessary to effect this social transformation, however, the Court 
unleashed an intellectual revolution that overturned the “Ancien 
Régime.” Daubert thus began as a modest attempt to expand district 
 
 5 See JOHN HENRY, THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN 
SCIENCE 1 (Palgrave Macmillan, 3d ed. 2008); STEVEN SHAPIN, THE SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTION 4-5 (The Univ. of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 1998). 
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courts’ management of their dockets but ended up bringing scientific 
enlightenment to the law. 
I. THE ANCIEN RÉGIME AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 
Courts are obligated to employ some sort of standard for expert 
evidence and so the main struggle in this area is over what principle 
they should use to set that standard.6 Few believe that courts should 
admit all relevant expert testimony that an advocate or proponent 
proffers. In short, the fundamental question boils down to this: how 
should courts decide what expert testimony gets to the fact-finder and 
what expert testimony does not?7 One possibility is to survey experts 
in the field and ask them whether the basis for proffered expert 
opinion is valid. A second possibility is to charge judges with the 
responsibility to consider the methods and principles underlying 
proffered expert opinion and have them make the validity 
determination. These two possibilities represent the two fundamental 
methods by which courts have historically evaluated expert evidence. 
The first, concerning what the relevant expert field thinks of the 
proffered expertise, is credited to Frye v. United States.8 The second, 
which would have courts independently assess the premises 
supporting the proffered expertise, is credited to Daubert. 
My focus in this Essay is on Daubert. But what Daubert is, and what 
it is not, can only be understood by looking at the cases and evidence 
rules that surround it. Rule 702 is the principal rule that controls 
expert evidence and was the ostensible focus of the Daubert decision. 
Daubert, however, generated not only a cottage industry for evidence 
scholars and volumes of judicial opinions on its meaning, but the 
Supreme Court revisited and refined its vision for experts two more 
times in the succeeding six years. Moreover, following what is now 
known as “the Daubert trilogy,” Rule 702 itself was amended in 2000 
 
 6 See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, in 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 3 (West 
Info. Pub. Grp. 2011-2012) (discussing how courts are obligated to employ some sort 
of standard for expert evidence and struggle over what principle should be used to set 
that standard). 
 7 See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges — Gatekeepers or Usurpers? 
Can the Trial Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without 
Invading the Jury’s Province to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) (“The fundamental issue is the allocation of factfinding 
power between the trial judge and jury.”). 
 8 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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to more fully reflect the Daubert regime.9 That year, the Supreme 
Court also offered important insights into its own view of Daubert in 
the lesser-known case of Weisgram v. Marley.10 Thus, twenty years 
after Daubert, there is much grist for the mill regarding the decision’s 
import and importance including the Court’s many pronouncements 
on the subject, the amended Rules of Evidence, scores of federal and 
state court interpretations, and a vast body of scholarly literature. 
Frye, of course, largely started it all and remains for many courts and 
commentators the touchstone, at least for scientific expert testimony. 
This section begins, therefore, with a relatively brief overview of Frye 
and then considers in somewhat greater detail the changes wrought by 
Daubert. If Daubert sparked a revolution, Frye represents the Ancien 
Régime. 
A. Frye’s Ancien Régime 
The basic requirement of scientific evidence under Frye is that it 
have “gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.”11 Although Frye was decided in 1923, it did not achieve true 
notoriety until the 1970s, around the time that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence were promulgated.12 In Frye, a 1923 District of Columbia 
 
 9 Rule 702 was amended in 2000 to embody the Daubert approach. See FED. R. 
EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (stating that Rule 702 was amended in response 
to Daubert, and many cases applying Daubert). The rule was then amended again in 
2011 when it was restyled along with the other Federal Rules. See id. (stating the 
Rules of Evidence were restyled “to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules”). This “restyling” was not 
intended to change the meaning of the rule. See id. Rule 702 now provides as follows: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the 
facts of the case. 
 10 528 U.S. 540 (2000). 
 11 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  
 12 See David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, 
Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of 
Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1808 n.25 (1994). 
FAIGMAN MACRO V2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2013 4:47 PM 
2013] The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity 107 
appellate decision, the defendant offered an expert to testify regarding 
the results of an early form of polygraph testing, the “systolic blood 
pressure deception test.” According to the expert, the test results 
supported James Alphonso Frye’s claim of innocence to a charge of 
murder.13 The court excluded the evidence. In the following often-
quoted paragraph, the court set forth a new test for assessing the 
admissibility of scientific testimony, the so-called general acceptance 
test: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line 
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult 
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force 
of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will 
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a 
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing 
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs.14 
The Frye test focuses courts’ attention on the respective field’s view of 
its own members’ work. Thus, the Frye test, above all, is self-
referential in that it is only as effective as the field doing the review. 
Although the Frye test appears straightforward, the simplicity of 
stating it belies the complexity inherent in applying it to concrete 
cases. There are three basic components to the Frye test, each with its 
own intricacies. These are the substance of the proffered opinion, the 
designation of what has been generally accepted, and the identity of 
the particular field doing the accepting. These three components 
generate three questions: (1) at what conceptual level should the 
expert opinion be judged; (2) whether the scientific principle that is 
relevant under applicable law is the same as what is generally accepted 
in the field; and (3) which scientific field should be consulted to assess 
general acceptance. I examine these in turn. 
The Frye test itself does not specify the conceptual level of 
generality at which the disputed “scientific principle or discovery” 
should be assessed. This issue, in fact, presents a spectrum of options 
for courts. On one pole, a court could simply find that a particular 
methodology is “generally accepted” and admit expert opinions based 
on that methodology without checking whether it was employed 
correctly or even permits the sort of opinions proffered. At this 
 
 13 See James Starrs, A Still Life Watercolor: Frye v. United States, 27 J. FORENSIC 
SCI. 684, 688 (1982). 
 14 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
FAIGMAN MACRO V2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2013 4:47 PM 
108 University of California, Davis [Vol. 46:nnn 
extreme, Frye would not require that the technique has been validated 
for the use to which it is put in the courtroom, so long as it is valid for 
some use. Such an approach might allow a neuroscientist to testify 
about a person’s gambling addiction using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) technology because fMRI methodology is 
generally accepted, even if it has not been validated for this particular 
use. At the other pole, a court might require not only that fMRI be a 
generally accepted technology, but that it could be, and was, properly 
applied to the case at hand. At this extreme, the trial court would be 
required to ensure that the specific application of the technique in the 
instant case was validly performed. A middle ground might involve a 
court checking whether the fMRI is a valid technology that extends to 
the particular use for which it is offered but, if so, leave to the fact-
finder the question whether the technology was employed reliably in 
the case at hand. Inevitably, the debate regarding where along this 
spectrum presents the better interpretation of a court’s obligations 
under Frye depends on the jurisdiction’s view of the proper division of 
authority between judge and fact-finder. A jurisdiction that gives 
judges little responsibility to ensure the accuracy of expert opinion 
evidence would limit threshold review to the most general level of 
assessment. Jurisdictions that mandate a rigorous role for judges 
would require a more searching and particularized assessment. 
A second question pivotal to the proper application of the Frye test 
is whether the scientific field conceptualizes the subject in the same 
way that the law understands it. After all, if the law asks whether a 
specific scientific principle is generally accepted, any 
misunderstanding regarding just what “principle” is at issue will 
invalidate the answer provided by the particular field. For example, if 
psychologists were asked whether Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) is generally accepted, their answer would be yes. PTSD is a 
well-accepted psychiatric diagnosis as indicated by its inclusion in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.15 However, its 
acceptance is limited to therapeutic purposes; it has not been validated 
for forensic purposes.16 The diagnosis of PTSD, therefore, might be 
reliably associated with a person having suffered some trauma, but 
may have little validity for identifying the source of that trauma. The 
former is necessary for PTSD’s therapeutic use; the latter is needed for 
forensic use. Merely asking whether a scientific methodology or 
 
 15 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DSM-IV-TR 463-68 (2000). 
 16 See id. at xxxiii (explicitly eschewing any claim of etiological verity of its 
diagnostic categories). 
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principle has been generally accepted is not enough. Courts ought to 
be careful to specify to what use the expertise will be put. 
The third pivotal question presented in the application of Frye is the 
matter of whom to ask about general acceptance, and, related to this, 
whether courts should actually survey a field to obtain the answer. It 
is intuitively obvious that this aspect of Frye is highly manipulable. 
Courts can influence the responses they receive by either narrowing or 
expanding the professional group that is defined as the “pertinent 
field” under Frye. If a court asks only neuroscientists who use fMRI 
technology to detect lying whether fMRI is generally accepted for lie 
detection, it is likely to get a skewed view of the acceptability (i.e., 
validity) of the technology for its intended use. Yet courts regularly 
limit their evaluation of the general acceptance of a scientific principle 
or discovery to those with a vested interest in its affirmation. For 
example, courts almost invariably ask only practicing latent-
fingerprint examiners whether latent-fingerprint identification is 
generally accepted.17 Not surprisingly, latent print examiners 
overwhelmingly agree that latent print examinations are valid. This 
approach is not much of a test, since their livelihoods depend on an 
affirmative answer. Courts would be well advised to reach beyond the 
narrow field of experts who are employed in the profession that is in 
question. 
Finally, although Frye seems to contemplate that courts will actually 
survey experts in particular fields, practice rarely matches this 
expectation. Trial courts tend to be convinced by testifying experts’ 
assurances that the bases for their opinions are generally accepted, 
though few experts are likely to have surveyed the field themselves or 
have access to such surveys done by others. Moreover, the “general 
acceptance criterion”18 refers to the opinions of scientists regarding the 
expertise, not the opinions of other courts. String citations of other 
courts’ admissibility decisions regarding the controverted expertise 
should not alone be sufficient to gauge “general acceptance.”19 What is 
generally accepted among courts may or may not be accepted by 
scientists in the field. In any case, while other courts’ acceptance of 
 
 17 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 32-33 (Mass. 2005) 
(finding fingerprint identification admissible under Daubert because it was generally 
accepted among fingerprint examiners). 
 18 See Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 19 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing other 
courts’ general acceptance of police officer expert testimony under a Daubert analysis). 
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some particular expertise is not irrelevant, it is almost certainly not 
what was intended by Frye.20 
Although Frye is not conventionally understood as requiring 
scientific sophistication, the above discussion makes clear that some 
appreciation of science would go far in ensuring the test’s 
functionality. In inquiring about general acceptance of a particular 
form of expert evidence, courts should at least ensure that it is valid at 
a reasonably precise conceptual level, that the scientific principle in 
question is one that is relevant under applicable law, and that the field 
accepting it is broad enough to include non-true-believers but narrow 
enough to include those who are knowledgeable in the field. For 
example, a court considering the admissibility of polygraph evidence 
under Frye should be able to define the level at which its validity is 
being assessed (i.e., general accord between physiological reactions 
and deception or as a diagnostic test of deception), the purpose for 
which the test is accepted (i.e., for lie detection or as a prop in 
interrogations), and the relevant field for assessing acceptance (i.e., 
polygraphers or behavioral scientists). 
Frye, therefore, is not necessarily incompatible with an empirically 
sophisticated use of expert evidence, but the test does not promote it 
either. In contrast, Daubert’s focus on the methods and principles 
underlying proffered expertise has exactly this effect. 
B. Daubert’s Revolutionary Principles 
Despite — or possibly as a result of — the volumes written on 
Daubert, the decision remains generally misunderstood in many 
respects. The basic holding of Daubert can be simply described. It has 
three components, the first two of which are largely uncontroversial. 
First, the expert evidence must be relevant; that is, it must relate to an 
issue in the case. The Court referred to this element as one of “fit,” in 
that the empirical basis for the evidence must help answer a fact in 
dispute.21 Second, the expert must be qualified to testify on the subject 
 
 20 As a separate consideration, courts might indeed find that precedent supports 
admission of challenged expertise, and citation of other court decisions would be 
entirely appropriate to demonstrate that judgment. This basis is distinct, however, 
from the inquiry set forth in Frye. 
 21 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993); see, e.g., McClain 
v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[The expert] testified 
at the Daubert hearing in a way more adjusted to agency-risk analysis than courtroom-
causation analysis.”); United States v. Birdsbill, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131 (D. Mont. 
2003) (excluding psychological test intended for diagnosis and treatment that was not 
designed for the forensic purpose of detecting when a person has sexually abused 
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at-hand. This element is fairly permissive and can be met “by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”22 It must be met, 
however, in light of the nature of the testimony being offered.23 Third, 
the “[p]roposed testimony must be supported by appropriate 
validation,” what the Daubert Court referred to as “good grounds.”24 
According to the Court, “the requirement that an expert’s testimony 
pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary 
reliability.”25 
Although the first two criteria for admissibility of expert evidence — 
relevance and qualifications of the expert — are essential, the third 
prong of reliability represents the revolutionary turn in this area. In 
order to assess the evidentiary reliability of proffered expert testimony, 
trial courts have the responsibility to examine the methodologies and 
principles underlying proffered expert testimony to determine 
whether those principles and methods are sufficiently valid to admit. 
Under Rule 104(a), a court must find this preliminary fact — that is, 
that the basis for the proffered evidence is sufficiently valid to support 
the expert’s testimony — by a preponderance of the evidence.26 The 
Daubert Court explained Rule 104(a)’s operation when a court is 
“[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony,” as follows: 
[T]he trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to 
Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) 
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to 
understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a 
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that 
 
children). 
 22 FED. R. EVID. 702; see, e.g., Banister v. Burton, 636 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 
2011) (holding that trauma surgeon was qualified to testify as to whether shooting 
victim had physical ability to throw something after he was shot, stating “[the expert] 
is a trauma surgeon who testified as to the nature and severity of [the victim’s] injuries 
at the time he treated him and then applied his knowledge of anatomy, gained 
through his experience as a trauma surgeon and as a student of medicine, to 
determine that the gunshot injuries would not have prevented [the victim] from using 
his arm to throw an object, or from crawling”). 
 23 See Lujano v. Town of Cicero, No. 07C4822, 2011 WL 6097719, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 6, 2011) (quoting Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 
1990)) (“Ultimately, ‘whether a witness is qualified as an expert can only be 
determined by comparing the area in which the witness has superior knowledge, skill, 
experience, or education with the subject matter of the witness’s testimony.’”).  
 24 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
 25 Id. 
 26 FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
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reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in 
issue.27 
The Daubert test, in contrast to Frye, focuses courts’ attention on the 
methods and principles ostensibly supporting proffered expert 
opinion. Whether that opinion is based on good grounds, therefore, is 
a preliminary inquiry for the trial judge to determine. 
In one sense, then, the gatekeeper function of Daubert is not very 
revolutionary at all. Under the Federal Rules, preliminary facts are 
handled routinely by this rule. Rule 104(a) simply requires that 
preliminary facts be decided by a preponderance of the evidence. So, 
on its face, expert evidence under Daubert is just like other kinds of 
evidence that require courts to find preliminary facts in the process of 
applying the Rules of Evidence. 
This point can be illustrated with the simple example of the “dying 
declaration,” which is an exception to the general rule against hearsay 
statements.28 In order for the hearsay exception for dying declarations 
to apply, the statement involved must have been made under a belief 
of imminent death. That is a factual question. But it is a factual 
question that is necessary to the application of the rule and thus one 
that courts must make. In order to determine whether a statement was 
made under a belief of imminent death, a court would likely hear from 
witnesses — such as doctors, nurses, family members, and so forth — 
regarding the declarant’s knowledge of his or her condition and 
likelihood of surviving. Rules of evidence are replete with preliminary 
facts that are necessary to their application. Other examples include 
whether a particular out-of-court statement was made in furtherance 
of a conspiracy under Rule 801(2)(E), or whether, under Rule 803(2), 
an out of court statement “relat[ed] to a startling event or condition, 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it 
caused.”29 Thus, under Daubert, the question whether the methods or 
principles underlying an expert opinion are more likely than not valid 
is merely a preliminary fact to be resolved under Rule 104(a). 
The question, however, is, “Well, just how do judges do that?” 
Inherent in this inquiry lies the revolutionary character of Daubert, as 
well as much of the confusion that has adhered to that decision. The 
Daubert Court noted that in exercising their gatekeeping function of 
 
 27 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 (emphasis added). 
 28 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (“In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case, a 
statement that the declarant, while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent, 
made about its cause or circumstances.”) 
 29 FED. R. EVID. 801(2)(E), 803(2). 
FAIGMAN MACRO V2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2013 4:47 PM 
2013] The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity 113 
evaluating the underlying basis for proffered scientific evidence, 
judges might consider certain factors that would help them make this 
determination. By now, these factors are well known and include 
testability, peer-review and publication, error rate, and general 
acceptance. With regard to testability, the Court found that the 
scientific status of testimony was tied to “it’s falsifiability, or 
refutability, or testability.”30 The Court asserted that, “a key question 
to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is 
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it 
can be (and has been) tested.”31 The second factor the Court identified, 
somewhat related to the first, was the “error rate” associated with the 
“particular scientific technique.”32 The Court provided precious little 
detail about how error rates affect admissibility, simply noting that 
courts should “ordinarily” consider them and ensure that “standards” 
exist to control “the technique’s operation.”33 The third factor the 
Court identified that might assist courts preliminarily assessing the 
validity of the methods and principles of proffered expert testimony 
 
 30 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: 
THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)). 
 31 Id. at 593 (emphasis added). For example, in Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 
663 F.3d 887, 899 (7th Cir. 2011), the court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of 
plaintiff’s engineering expert who sought to testify that a scaffold was defectively 
designed causing plaintiff’s fall and subsequent injuries. The Seventh Circuit criticized 
the expert’s more than “shaky” proof, including his use of Google to search for articles 
on “brittle fracture,” the putative cause of the accident. Id. at 894. More generally, the 
court observed as follows: 
[The expert] made no attempt to test his hypothesis. [Plaintiff] suggests that 
this inquiry is unnecessary because [the expert] needed nothing more than 
his engineering background and experience to conclude that the caster stem 
collapsed on account of a brittle fracture brought on by overtightening. But 
that theory is certainly capable of being tested. 
Id. Compare Charney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 10-14267-CIV, 2011 WL 3844077, 
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2011) (finding adequate the fire expert’s contention that “he 
‘tested’ the hypothesis through mental exercises”), with Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co. v. 
Tecumseh Prod. Co., 767 F. Supp. 2d 549, 555 (D. Md. 2011) (“Neither Plaintiff nor 
[the fire expert] himself describe any attempts to gather data or create conditions that 
might falsify his explanation, which is what testing, in its scientific sense, means. 
Rather, all the Court is able to infer from these vague and conclusory accounts is that 
[the expert] observed three different heat pumps, imagined a sequence of events that 
would be consistent with his observations, and went no further.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 32 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 33 Id. See generally D. Michael Risinger, Whose Fault? — Daubert, the NAS Report, 
and the Notion of Error in Forensic Science, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 519, 519-20, 527-29 
(2010). 
FAIGMAN MACRO V2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2013 4:47 PM 
114 University of California, Davis [Vol. 46:nnn 
was whether the research “has been subjected to peer review and 
publication.”34 The Court emphasized that this factor was “not a sine 
qua non of admissibility,” but was a “relevant . . . consideration in 
assessing . . . scientific validity.”35 Finally, the Court stated, “‘general 
acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.”36 Lack of general 
acceptance, the Court observed, may lead judges to view the particular 
evidence “with skepticism.”37 
Early on, some courts and commentators thought that these four 
factors constituted the holding of Daubert.38 But this approach is 
incorrect. The holding of Daubert is the requirement that judges find 
as a preliminary fact that the methods and principles underlying 
proffered expert testimony are sufficiently valid to support that 
testimony. The four “Daubert factors” were offered as guidelines to 
help courts assess expert testimony. These guidelines will sometimes 
be helpful, and sometimes not, and courts might consider other 
 
 34 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 35 Id.; see, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 721 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(finding that district court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiff’s experts on the 
sole basis that the research they relied on had not appeared in peer reviewed journals). 
 36 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 37 Id. In United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (D. Md. 2002), the court 
considered a variety of different kinds of standard field sobriety tests (SFSTs), such as 
the “walk and turn” test, the “one leg stand” test, and the “horizontal gaze nystagmus” 
test. On the question of general acceptance, the court offered the following insightful 
observations regarding what group of professionals should be surveyed to gauge 
acceptance: 
Similarly, despite the conclusion of many state courts that the SFSTs have 
received general acceptance among criminologists, law enforcement 
personnel, highway safety experts and prosecutors, I remain skeptical 
whether this is sufficient for purposes of Daubert and Kumho Tire. 
Acceptance by a relevant scientific or technical community implies that that 
community has the expertise critically to evaluate the methods and 
principles that underlie the test or opinion in question. However skilled law 
enforcement officials, highway safety specialists, prosecutors and 
criminologists may be in their fields, the record before me provides scant 
comfort that these communities have the expertise needed to evaluate the 
methods and procedures underlying human performance tests such as the 
SFSTs. 
Id. at 557. 
 38 See, e.g., Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 567-68 (N.D. Ill. 
1993) (stating that Daubert requires the consideration of certain factors, namely 
“whether the technique (or theory) being advanced by the expert can be or has been 
tested,” “whether there is peer review and publication of the technique,” and “general 
acceptance”). 
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criteria to help them make the necessary preliminary inquiry.39 It is 
clear, however, that courts must use some set of criteria and explain 
clearly what they are. Moreover, as Justice Scalia pointed out 
concurring in Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael, although “the 
Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to 
apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an 
abuse of discretion.”40 
On its face, therefore, Daubert merely employed the existing 
scaffolding of the Federal Rules of Evidence to make scientific validity 
a preliminary fact necessary to the application of Rule 702. This 
scaffolding, however, concealed the radical character of the decision. 
Like most revolutionary ideas, the incendiary core of Daubert is a 
simple one. Daubert altered the perspective by which expert evidence, 
and particularly scientific research, was evaluated by the courts. Prior 
to Daubert, courts at most inspected merely the outer forms of expert 
evidence. Daubert reset courts’ gaze onto the inner workings of 
knowledge gathering. This shift marked a sea change and gave to 
courts the core instrument of the enlightenment, the scientific 
method. Daubert constituted a frontal assault on the Ancien Régime, 
thus giving birth to modernity in the law’s use of expertise. 
C. Daubert’s Revolutionary Turn 
Daubert focused courts’ attention on the methods of knowledge 
gathering. Judges under Daubert were expected to know how science 
worked, not simply rely on self-proclaimed experts to tell them what 
to believe. The Daubert Court tasked lower courts with the obligation 
to assess “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”41 This task 
plainly demands that judges have a fairly sophisticated understanding 
of research methods and statistics. There can be little doubt that this 
obligation to learn about science was a basic premise of the Daubert 
holding. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist famously complained that 
while Rule 702 “confides to the judge some gatekeeping 
 
 39 See, e.g., Marcum v. Adventist Health System/West, 193 P.3d 1, 4 (Or. 2008) 
(listing seven factors that may be considered in determining the admissibility of 
scientific evidence); see also Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New 
Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 911-12 (1982) (listing eleven factors 
for determining admissibility). 
 40 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 159 (1999) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 41 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. 
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responsibility,” he did not think that it imposed “on them either the 
obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists.”42 While 
there are many contested issues in Daubert and its progeny, the fact 
that the holding demands that judges must now understand the 
methods and principles of science is not one of them.43 
Under Frye’s general acceptance test, in contrast, judges seemingly 
need little or no understanding of science.44 All that is necessary is the 
ability to count. Daubert separated the expertise from the respective 
guilds that stood to benefit from their expertise being accepted by 
courts. The question after Daubert became, “Where are your data?” It 
was no longer, “Who else agrees with you?” This shift moved the 
judicial focus from counting noses among the numerous guilds that 
ply their wares in courtrooms everyday to examining the data, 
methods, principles, and standards on which these guilds’ supposed 
expertise lay. 
What is most clear in Daubert is the basis on which proffered expert 
evidence should be judged. It is to be screened on its empirical merit, 
rather than its general acceptance among like-minded members of 
 
 42 Id. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See 
generally David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists”, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207, 1209 
(2006) (“In the twenty-first century — and the sooner the better — judges have no 
choice but to become amateur scientists.”). 
 43 See PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE CAMPBELL 
MORIARITY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.08[b], at 45-48 (5th ed. 2012); Bert Black, 
Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: 
A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 753-57 (1994); Bert Black, 
Focus on Science, Not Checklists, 39 TRIAL 24, 24 (Dec. 2003). There are many 
examples illustrating this fact, but two in particular are telling. First, on remand to the 
Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski described the Daubert rule as “daunting.” Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Federal judges ruling 
on the admissibility of expert scientific testimony face a far more complex and 
daunting task in a post-Daubert world than before.”). Second, Justice Breyer, 
concurring in General Electric Company v. Joiner, observed that the Daubert holding 
“will sometimes ask judges to make subtle and sophisticated determinations about 
scientific methodology and its relation to the conclusions an expert witness seeks to 
offer.” 118 S. Ct. 512, 520 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 44 I say seemingly because a sophisticated use of Frye would require a substantial 
understanding of science in at least two respects. Foremost, judges using Frye should 
know enough science to know what the relevant field is. Many courts, for instance, 
ask the very practitioners peddling the expertise whether their expertise is generally 
accepted. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 32-33 (Mass. 2005) 
(finding latent fingerprint identification admissible because it was generally accepted 
among fingerprint examiners). If courts ask only latent fingerprint examiners whether 
latent fingerprint examination is generally accepted, the answer is fairly 
predetermined. Asking astrologers whether astrology is generally accepted will 
produce a similar positive response. 
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some guild. The question that arises with the recognition that Daubert 
manifests an intellectual revolution in expert evidence law is why, or 
to what end? Certainly, it is possible that the Court merely interpreted 
Rule 702 to incorporate scientific sensibilities into the evidentiary 
gatekeeping responsibilities of trial court judges. If true, this 
interpretation would make the passage of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence akin to Galileo’s heretical publication of the Dialogue 
Concerning Two Chief World Systems. Galileo’s Dialogue, an early 
hallmark of the scientific revolution, marks a fundamental transition 
point away from pre-scientific thinking. Perhaps the Federal Rules and 
Daubert were intended to mark a similar transition in the law. 
However much respect we might have for Justice Blackmun and the 
Court, this interpretation is a bit too generous. The more likely 
purpose for Daubert and its progeny is more pedestrian. Specifically, 
the Daubert trilogy principally concerned the fundamental purpose for 
rules of evidence, which are meant to set the boundary between the 
judge’s responsibility to determine admissibility and the fact-finder’s 
responsibility to assess weight. But the story is slightly more 
complicated than that. While the Daubert trilogy surely defined the 
division of labor for finding facts between judge and jury, it also 
broadened trial courts’ managerial responsibilities. As the next section 
seeks to demonstrate, the Court’s revolutionary turn to the more 
enlightened scientific perspective is integral to its apparent intention 
to permit trial judges greater power to better manage their dockets. 
II. DAUBERT AS A POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN CASE MANAGEMENT 
A central focus of debate immediately after Daubert was whether 
courts were up to the daunting task of evaluating the empirical merit 
of proffered expert testimony. A close second to this issue of the 
judiciary’s scientific literacy was the question of the effect the Daubert 
ruling would have on the admission of experts. The initial 
presumption was that Daubert was meant to hold the line against junk 
science, thus meaning it would lead to greater exclusion of proffered 
expertise.45 As this section explains, there are good reasons for 
 
 45 This perception was the conclusion, for example, that Linda Greenhouse 
reached in her New York Times story reporting the decision. See Linda Greenhouse, 
Supreme Court Roundup: Justices Put Judges in Charge of Deciding Reliability of Scientific 
Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/29/us/ 
thesupreme-court-supreme-court-roundup-justices-put-judges-charge-deciding.html 
(“[U]nderlying the majority opinion was a concern that judges would not [be doing] 
their jobs if they left it to juries to sort out untried or disputed theories.”). Courts and 
commentators were more inclined to disagree on this matter. See infra note 50. 
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reaching this conclusion. But Daubert is not simply an anti-junk 
science case. The move to a science-based evidence scheme was, to be 
sure, intended to tighten the rules of expert evidence. But this 
tightening, I believe, was meant to serve a greater agenda than simply 
an evidentiary one. It was meant to serve the managerial power of trial 
courts to control their dockets. The first part of this section focuses on 
the Supreme Court’s cases in this area and the 2000 amendment to the 
Federal Rules, which effectively codified that case law. The second 
part argues that this revolution in perspective — i.e., the move from 
Frye’s Ancien Régime to Daubert’s scientific worldview — is a 
component of a much larger phenomenon in trial court practice, what 
has been referred to as “managerial judging.”46 
A. The Daubert Trilogy, Plus Two 
Conventionally understood, Daubert is not a single case. It is 
generally described as a trilogy of cases, including Daubert itself, 
General Electric Company v. Joiner,47 and Kumho Tire Company v. 
Carmichael.48 To fully appreciate the import of the Daubert revolution, 
however, two additional developments must be considered. The first is 
the case of Weisgram v. Marley,49 in which the Court provided its own 
interpretation of Daubert’s significance. The second is the 2000 
amendment of Rule 702, which largely codified the Daubert holding. 
Close study of these five developments from 1993 through 2000 — 
the Daubert trilogy, Weisgram, and Rule 702 — makes abundantly 
clear the Court’s own view that 1993 marked a fundamental 
transformation in the law’s use of expert evidence. 
1. The Flexibly Liberal but Rigorously Conservative Daubert 
Standard 
While plaintiffs’ attorneys read Daubert to be a permissive standard 
that would admit more expert evidence, not surprisingly, perhaps, 
 
 46 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982); see also 
Robert Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case 
From Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 770 (1981). Daubert’s role in 
facilitating active case management has been noted by others. See, e.g., Sandra F. 
Gavin, Managerial Judging in a Post-Daubert World: A Reliability Paradigm, 234 F.R.D. 
196, 196, 204-06 (2006) (arguing, critically, that this role for Daubert represents a 
“shift to the right”). 
 47 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 48 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 49 528 U.S. 440 (2000). 
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defense attorneys believed that Daubert would do the opposite and 
result in the exclusion of more expert evidence.50 This debate has not 
appreciably ebbed with time. Judges have long disagreed over whether 
Daubert or Frye is the more restrictive test.51 Close consideration of 
this issue, however, suggests that, at least theoretically, neither test is 
inherently more permissive nor more rigorous than the other. It 
depends on the evidence being evaluated under the respective test; the 
tests alone are not inherently liberal or conservative. 
Much of the blame for the hand-wringing that occurred over the 
political consequences of the Daubert ruling lies with the Court itself. 
The Daubert opinion is comprised of a cornucopia of confused 
messages. The opinion began with a paean to the liberality of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and the need for fact-finders to hear all 
relevant evidence. Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court observed 
that the “basic standard of relevance” in the Federal Rules “is a liberal 
one.”52 It also noted the Rules’ “permissive backdrop” and the “austere 
standard” inherent in the traditional Frye approach.53 Most 
significantly, the Court stated that the “rigid ‘general acceptance’ 
requirement would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal 
Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 
‘opinion’ testimony.’”54 But much of the opinion concerned itself with 
the trial court’s “gatekeeping” role and its need to evaluate the 
“reliability” of proffered expert opinion. The Court stated plainly that 
Rule 702 “clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the 
subjects and theories about which an expert may testify.”55 The Court 
held that “under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all 
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but 
 
 50 Compare David Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2164-66 (1994) 
(discussing when a plaintiff’s evidence can be excluded under Daubert to the benefit of 
the defendant), with Kenneth Chesebro, Taking Daubert’s “Focus” Seriously: The 
Methodology/Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745, 1745-53 (1994) 
(discussing how the Court in Daubert was deferential to the plaintiff’s experts). 
 51 Compare MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Patriarch Partners VIII, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 3255, 
2012 WL 2568972, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2012) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993)) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence favor the 
admissibility of expert testimony and are applied with a ‘liberal thrust.’”), with Cavallo 
v. Star Enterprise, 892 F. Supp. 756, 774 (E.D. Va. 1995) (“Daubert assigned district 
courts a more vigorous role to play in ferreting out expert opinion not based on the 
scientific method.”). 
 52 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). 
 53 Id. at 588.  
 54 Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). 
 55 Id. at 589. 
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reliable.”56 Most significantly, the Court said that this holding required 
trial courts to be gatekeepers.57 And the Court recognized that, “in 
practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, 
inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic 
insights and innovations.”58 The Court accepted this “balance,” since 
“Rules of Evidence [are] designed not for the exhaustive search for 
cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal 
disputes.”59 
Daubert’s mixed messages sparked considerable speculation over 
whether the practical effect of Daubert would be less or more expert 
testimony being admitted in court. It turns out that both views have 
some truth to them. The split depends on the nature of the expertise, 
or at least it should split on the basis of the nature of the expertise. 
And that is because the revolution of Daubert really lies in the 
scientific worldview it embraces. Frye, which requires judges to ask, 
“Is this method generally accepted in the particular field from which it 
comes?” is essentially a deferential test. Judges do not need to know 
very much about science; they simply need to be able to count. So 
judges ask, “You epidemiologists, is this method generally accepted? 
Raise your hand. One, two, three, four. Those who think it’s not 
generally accepted? One, two, three.” Daubert, in contrast, requires 
that judges understand the methods and principles underlying science. 
They have to understand what a mean, median, or mode is. They have 
to understand basic hypothesis testing and research methods, possibly 
what a standard deviation is, and maybe even regression analysis. And 
if they do not, they cannot be effective gatekeepers. And it is this 
insight that should answer the question whether Daubert’s effect will 
be to admit more expert evidence, or less. 
In traditional scientific fields, in which scientists collect data and 
vigorously debate their meaning, Daubert should lead to more 
generous admissibility standards than Frye’s general acceptance test. 
Within mainstream science, hypotheses are more likely to have been 
rigorously tested, despite ongoing debate about the details. Daubert 
permits courts to consider the validity of the methods and principles 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 588 (“That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not 
mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of 
purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such 
evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all 
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”). 
 58 Id. at 597. 
 59 Id. 
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underlying such expertise, and does not require a consensus to form 
in the field. In contrast, in less traditional scientific fields, where little 
or no data are collected and little or no vigorous debate occurs, 
Daubert should lead to less generous admissibility standards than 
Frye’s general acceptance test. In those fields, consensus has replaced 
testing. Whereas Frye would admit such expertise based on the 
consensus of the guild, Daubert inquires into the basis for this 
consensus. 
A good example of science coming to the law from a traditional field 
is DNA profiling. At least in theory, DNA profiling should have been 
accepted sooner in Daubert jurisdictions than in Frye jurisdictions.60 
DNA profiling was tested, published in peer reviewed journals, and 
had known error rates. But in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there 
was considerable disagreement among scientists regarding, in 
particular, what could be said statistically when finding a “match.”61 
Healthy science operates in exactly this way. Vibrant debate, critical 
commentary, and vehement disagreement are all hallmarks of 
mainstream science. These characteristics can also mean that 
consensus can be slow to develop, even when the fundamental science 
is relatively sound. Well-tested, peer reviewed and published research, 
with acceptable error rates, will often continue to attract strong 
discussion, especially at the margins. Under those circumstances, 
Daubert would be more liberal in admitting the evidence. In contrast, 
under Frye, a court might say, “Well, we really need to wait for 
consensus, let’s slow down.” So for a traditional scientific field, 
Daubert would be more likely to admit it and Frye would be more 
likely to exclude and await consensus. 
In a field that is not traditionally scientific — and there is a lot of 
evidence from such fields that the courts admit62 — Daubert would 
operate as a more rigorous test and Frye would be a more permissive 
 
 60 I say “in theory” because to my knowledge no one has closely studied this 
particular question. 
 61 Compare David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and the 
Courts, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 101, 119-20 (1993) (stating that simply sampling people 
in the relevant population, analyzing their DNA, and reporting the number who 
match the crime sample raises evidentiary and statistical concerns), with Richard C. 
Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing, 254 SCIENCE 
1745 (1991) (stating that the discussion of DNA statistics should focus on both the 
significance of matches and mismatches). See generally DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE 
HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (Harvard Univ. Press, 1st ed. 2010) (discussing the 
struggle between prosecutors and defense attorneys over the admissibility of DNA 
evidence).  
 62 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 91-97. 
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test. Consider, for example, fields such as latent fingerprint 
identification, firearms, clinical psychology, and clinical psychiatry. In 
those fields, if judges ask the question, “Where are the data?” they 
would be met with blank stares. If you ask a latent fingerprint 
examiner, “Where are your data?” the answer is likely to be, “Data. 
We have no data. In fact, we don’t need data. We’re specialists.” This 
attitude is reminiscent of that famous movie line, “We don’t need no 
stinkin’ badges.”63 Many of these experts have been practicing their 
trade for twenty-five years; they know it when they see it. They don’t 
need no stinkin’ data. Under Daubert, however, even if your data 
happen to be experience, you have to be able to articulate how you 
came to know what you think you know.64 
2. What the Daubert Trilogy Sought to Accomplish 
Early on, courts and commentators began to consider whether the 
gatekeeping role extended beyond trial courts. Specifically, logic might 
dictate that appellate courts could have as large a role as trial courts in 
ensuring that expert evidence was reliable. This duty might be 
especially so if the ultimate objective is to develop a judicially more 
sophisticated approach to scientific evidence. In General Electric 
Company v. Joiner, however, the Supreme Court rejected the idea of 
appellate court gatekeepers. In the case below, the plaintiff claimed 
 
 63 The line quoted in the text is from Mel Brooks’s inspired western comedy 
BLAZING SADDLES (Warner Brothers Pictures 1974), clip available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lj056ao6GE (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). The 
original version of this line comes from the book The Treasure of the Sierra Madre: 
“All right,” Curtin shouted back. “If you are the police, where are your 
badges? Let’s see them.” 
 “Badges, to god-damned hell with badges! We have no badges. In fact, we 
don’t need badges. I don’t have to show you any stinking badges, you god-
damned cabrón and ching’ tu madre!” 
B. TRAVEN, THE TREASURE OF THE SIERRA MADRE 193 (The World Publ’g Co., 1st ed. 
1947). 
 64 The Advisory Committee emphasizes the need not to simply accept 
“experience,” without checking the basis for believing that the experience will 
produce reliable testimony. The Rules Committee commented as follows: 
If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness 
must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that 
experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is 
reliably applied to the facts. The trial court’s gatekeeping function requires 
more than simply “taking the expert’s word for it.”  
FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee’s note.  
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that his exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) had enhanced 
the onset of his lung cancer. The trial court had excluded the 
plaintiff’s experts under a Daubert analysis. The Eleventh Circuit 
reversed, holding that appellate courts maintained a duty to review a 
lower court’s admissibility decisions, where the trial court excluded 
proffered expert testimony and this exclusion was outcome 
determinative.65 For the Eleventh Circuit, this stringent review was 
mandated since it read Daubert to indicate that the Supreme Court 
envisioned a “lower threshold” for expert testimony.66 The appellate 
court believed that the judge’s gatekeeping role is limited to excluding 
experts whose testimony is “mere speculation,” but does not require a 
substantive review of the scientific basis for the expert opinion.67 
The principal issue before the Joiner Court concerned the issue of 
the appropriate standard of appellate review of trial court Daubert 
decisions. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a unanimous Court, 
ruling that appellate courts owe deference to a trial court’s 
admissibility rulings. The Court held “that abuse of discretion is the 
appropriate standard.”68 The Eleventh Circuit had erred in second-
guessing the trial court’s determination that the proffered expert 
testimony was unreliable.69 There are several aspects of Joiner that are 
 
 65 Joiner v. Gen. Electric Co., 78 F.3d 524, 528 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 66 Id. at 530. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997). 
 69 One aspect of Joiner displays the Court’s basic lack of understanding of science. 
In adopting the abuse of discretion standard, the Joiner Court treated scientific 
evidence just like other kinds of evidence that trial courts hear. The preliminary fact 
issue regarding validity under Rule 702, the Court believed, was functionally 
equivalent to preliminary fact questions presented by other rules, such as hearsay. But 
scientific evidence is different. In most evidentiary contexts, the preliminary 
assessment that is required to admit or exclude ordinary evidence is specific to the 
case at hand. In contrast, a significant component of assessing virtually all scientific 
evidence involves making judgments about matters that transcend particular cases. 
For instance, whether, and at what level, fMRI technology can validly distinguish 
people who are lying from people telling the truth is not specific to a particular case. 
Similarly, whether the brain structure or function of “psychopaths” is distinguishable 
from that of “normal” brains is a subject of general research findings. As regards the 
validity of scientific claims that transcend particular cases, therefore, a rule that would 
make appellate courts partners in the gatekeeping process might reflect the core 
principles inherent in Daubert better than the abuse of discretion standard embraced 
in Joiner. See generally David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under 
Daubert and Joiner, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1997) (arguing that the appellate courts are 
uniquely situated to determine and balance the policy implications raised by the 
science, to ensure consistency across jurisdictions, and to evaluate the methods, 
principles and reasoning of multiple research studies); Christopher B. Mueller, 
Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find the Right 
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relevant to the question of how the Court understood its own test. 
First, the Joiner Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, which had 
adopted a non deferential appellate standard that had a thumb on the 
scale in favor of admissibility. According to the Joiner Court, the 
Eleventh Circuit had over interpreted the Federal Rules’ display of a 
preference for admissibility.70 The Joiner Court highlighted the 
language from Daubert that obligated trial courts to screen expert 
evidence to “‘ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence 
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.’”71 
A second aspect of Joiner worthy of note was that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court. Rehnquist had written 
separately in Daubert, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and 
had famously complained that the Court’s ruling would force trial 
judges to become “amateur scientists.”72 But in Joiner, Rehnquist 
considered in some detail the research that the district court had 
found insufficient to support admissibility of the plaintiff’s expert’s 
testimony, thus himself becoming something of the amateur scientist 
that he decried in Daubert.73 
The third significant aspect of Joiner was the Court’s clarification of 
the language in Daubert that a trial court’s “focus, of course, must be 
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that 
they generate.”74 This language had been cited by courts and 
commentators as limiting the reach of the district court’s gatekeeping 
responsibilities.75 But the Joiner Court observed that “nothing in either 
Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to 
admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the 
ipse dixit of the expert.”76 
The next big question on the Daubert horizon after Joiner concerned 
the intended reach of that decision. Daubert, as noted, required courts 
to ask, at least, whether the basis for proffered expert opinion 
 
Answers, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 987 (2003) (arguing that appellate courts should 
apply a de novo standard when reviewing rulings admitting or excluding evidence 
presented as science). For the time being, however, the abuse of discretion standard 
remains the prevailing rule in federal cases. I return to this issue infra Part III.A. 
 70 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 140. 
 71 Id. at 142 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). 
 72 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 73 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144-46. 
 74 Id. at 146 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595).  
 75 See, e.g., Chesebro, supra note 50, at 1746-48 (discussing the distinction 
between an expert’s “methodology” and an expert’s “conclusion” in Daubert).  
 76 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. 
FAIGMAN MACRO V2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2013 4:47 PM 
2013] The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity 125 
testimony had been tested. However, many experts that had been 
longtime participants in the judicial process testified largely, if not 
entirely, based on experience or using technologies that had never 
been validated. Experts from forensics, clinical medicine, clinical 
psychology, and many other fields simply had no answer to the 
question, “Where are the data that support your opinion?” A faithful 
application of Daubert seemed to demand the exclusion of such 
veritable forms of expertise as latent fingerprints and firearms 
identification, medical and psychological diagnoses, and many others. 
The nonscientific specialists’ response to this fundamental challenge 
was elegant, if facile. Rule 702 speaks of “scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge.” Daubert, they argued, applies only to 
scientific expertise. Technical experts or specialists do not fall within 
the trial court’s gatekeeping responsibilities. Overnight, forensic 
scientists and others shed their white coats and became specialists, 
hoping to escape the rigors of scientific scrutiny. 
In Kumho Tire, however, the Court disagreed that there was any 
relevant evidentiary distinction between science and nonscience. 
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the Court, said that “it would prove 
difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules 
under which a gatekeeping obligation depended upon a distinction 
between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ 
knowledge. There is no clear line that divides the one from the 
others.”77 The Court also rejected the proposition that jurors are likely 
to be more impressed with the science label than with technical or 
specialized expertise. The Court observed that all experts are given 
considerable leeway to offer opinion evidence. Any concern with triers 
of fact yielding to the authority of scientific opinion was similarly 
present with all expert testimony.78 
The more difficult issue presented under Daubert, and one brought 
into question by Kumho Tire, involved the manner in which trial 
courts should carry out their gatekeeping duties given the multitude of 
disciplines that enter courtrooms every day. The Daubert factors could 
not be applied to every sort of expert, and the rigor represented by 
those factors might not be appropriate in all cases. Rule 702, the 
subject of Daubert and its progeny, applies to neuroscience, real estate 
appraisals, accounting, DNA technology, social psychology, and 
clinical medicine. Kumho Tire extended Daubert beyond just 
“scientific” expertise but elided the question of how trial courts should 
 
 77 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999). 
 78 See id. 
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measure the validity of the great variety of expertises that courts 
confront daily. The Supreme Court stated: 
The conclusion, in our view, is that we can neither rule out, 
nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the applicability of the 
factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we do so for subsets of 
cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence. 
Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the 
particular case at issue . . . . [A] trial court should consider the 
specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable 
measures of the reliability of the expert testimony.79 
Kumho Tire thus imposes on trial courts the responsibility to examine 
the premises of all expert opinion, whether derived from rigorous 
experimental tests or daily experience with the subject. The ultimate 
question is whether the expert testimony is based on good grounds. 
But what grounds qualify as good is something of a moving target. 
The debate over Daubert’s import did not cease after Kumho Tire, 
despite the strong language Justice Breyer brought to the expertise 
proffered in that case. The Court emphasized that Daubert “imposes a 
special obligation upon a trial judge to ‘ensure that any and all 
scientific testimony . . . is not only relevant, but reliable.’”80 That 
special obligation, moreover, applies to any “knowledge [that] might 
become the subject of expert testimony,” not just of the scientific 
variety.81 The Court stated emphatically, “And where such testimony’s 
factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called 
sufficiently into question . . . the trial judge must determine whether 
the testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of 
[the relevant] discipline.’”82 This mandate could be said to be the 
 
 79 Id. at 150-52; see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, Nos. 10-4725, 10-4729, 2012 
WL 2951410, at *5 (4th Cir. July 20, 2012) (“The Daubert factors . . . simply are not 
applicable to this kind of testimony [from a gang expert], whose reliability depends 
heavily on the knowledge and experience of the expert, rather than the methodology 
or theory behind it.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 80 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 
579, 589 (1993)). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 149 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, 
The Meaning of “Appropriate Validation” in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., Interpreted in Light of the Broader Rationalist Tradition, Not the Narrow Scientific 
Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 739 (2003) (“The courts should be open to a 
variety of validation techniques, including, but not limited to, empirical induction and 
mathematical deduction. Adopting the attitude of a skeptical rationalist, the judge 
ought to inquire whether the results of the use of the technique in question 
demonstrate that the technique ‘works’; that is, whether the technique enables the 
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hallmark of modern scientific discovery. The scientific revolution, 
after all, was never really about what we know, but how we come to 
know it. Kumho Tire was as express an invitation to trial courts to join 
the scientific revolution as the Court could have fashioned. 
The Court’s own pronouncements in Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho 
Tire seemingly make clear that the gatekeeping responsibility imposed 
on trial courts was intended to be a serious and substantive one. If 
there was any question about this, however, it should have been 
answered by a fourth case, an unusual situation in which the Court 
had the opportunity to comment on the Daubert line of cases. In 
Weisgram the trial court had admitted expert testimony regarding the 
source of a fire that destroyed the plaintiff’s home.83 The jury returned 
a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the 
lower court erred when it admitted the plaintiff’s experts, finding that 
they failed to pass muster under Daubert. Significantly, and 
controversially, the Eighth Circuit then ruled that, without this expert 
evidence, the plaintiff had insufficient evidence to support his case, 
and the court then directed a judgment in favor of the defendant. 
Thus, the Eighth Circuit refused to remand the case to the trial court 
to give the plaintiff a second “bite at the apple.” In agreeing that the 
plaintiffs should not be given a second chance to find admissible 
experts, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, stated: 
Since Daubert . . . parties relying on expert evidence have had 
notice of the exacting standards of reliability such evidence must 
meet. It is implausible to suggest, post-Daubert, that parties 
will initially present less than their best expert evidence in the 
expectation of a second chance should their first try fail. We 
therefore find unconvincing [the plaintiffs’] fears that allowing 
courts of appeals to direct the entry of judgment for 
defendants will punish plaintiffs who could have shored up 
their cases by other means had they known their expert 
testimony would be found inadmissible.84 
The final piece of the puzzle regarding Daubert’s true import comes 
from amended Rule 702. Despite the Daubert Court’s statement that it 
was merely interpreting Rule 702 as it would interpret any statute, 
 
expert to accurately perform the specific task at hand. As the task itself varies, as when 
the expert puts the technique to different uses and applications, the required 
validation must also change.”). 
 83 Weisgram v. Marley, 528 U.S. 440, 445 (2000). 
 84 Id. at 456-57 (emphasis added). 
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Rule 702 was amended in 2000.85 Rule 702 requires that an “expert’s 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” be “based on 
sufficient facts or data,” “the product of reliable principles and 
methods,” and “reliably applied . . . to the facts of the case.”86 This 
amendment effectively codifies several key provisions of the Daubert 
trilogy. First, it maintains the judge’s gatekeeping role to ensure that 
the expert testimony is based on reliable principles and methods. 
Second, this role extends to all expert evidence, not just scientific 
evidence. Third, it adds the word “sufficient,” mandating that courts 
not simply evaluate whether there are some facts or data supporting 
the expert’s opinion, but that those bases are sufficient to support that 
opinion. Finally, and somewhat less remarked upon than the other 
components of Rule 702, the amendment obligates trial courts to 
check whether the basis for the expert’s opinion can be “reliably 
applied” to the particular case. 
The Daubert trilogy, together with Weisgram and amended Rule 702, 
fairly well demonstrate that the Court meant to impose at least not-
insubstantial demands on proffered expert evidence. These authorities 
accomplished this heightened inspection through the adoption of a 
test with a certain degree of scientific sophistication. On its face, at 
least, this observation suggests that the Court sought to bring a certain 
scientific sensibility to evidentiary decisions about expert evidence. 
The Daubert trilogy, under this view, would signify that the law had 
finally joined the scientific revolution. As the next section discusses, 
however, the purpose of the Daubert trilogy was more pedestrian than 
that, albeit still revolutionary. It was politically revolutionary, though 
by choosing the scientific paradigm as its vehicle, the Court sparked 
an intellectual revolution at the same time. 
III. MANAGERIAL JUDGING 
Throughout this Essay, two hypotheses have competed to explain 
the Daubert trilogy. Both posit that Daubert was a revolutionary 
event.87 One holds that it was a revolution of ideas, bringing scientific 
 
 85 The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules proposed amending the rule “on 
experts in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert.” Advisory Committee on 
Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Evidence (Apr. 6-7, 1998) 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ 
0498evidenceminutes.htm. 
 86 FED. R. EVID. 702. The quoted language is drawn from the “restyled rules,” 
which went into effect in 2012. The restyling was not intended to change the meaning 
of any of the rules. 
 87 Of course, other hypotheses are possible, including that Daubert was not 
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sensibilities to the law of evidence, and any political ramifications 
were secondary. The second holds that it was a revolution of politics, 
intended to give trial courts greater managerial power over their 
dockets, and any intellectual ramifications were secondary. Based on 
several grounds, the second hypothesis appears to accord more closely 
to the evidence. 
This section examines these grounds. Space precludes an exhaustive 
treatment of the issue, and indeed this matter could occupy a book. 
But, on the whole, the evidence appears clear that Daubert and its 
progeny were designed to improve trial courts’ ability to manage 
cases.88 In particular, three separate grounds support this conclusion: 
(1) the Court’s repeated statements throughout the Daubert trilogy 
regarding trial court discretion and deferential appellate review for 
admissibility decisions; (2) the disposition of the cases of the Daubert 
trilogy, as well as Weisgram; and (3) the more vehement results 
stemming from the rigors of Daubert in civil cases than in criminal 
cases.89 
 
revolutionary at all. Bert Black fondly tells the story of what Judge Thomas Reavley 
said about Daubert: “Never has a case changed the law so little and practice so much.” 
Bert Black, Remarks at the University of California, Davis Law Review Symposium: 
The Daubert Hearing — From All the Critical Perspectives (Mar. 2, 2012), in 46 UC 
DAVIS L. REV. <FIRST PAGE OF TRANSCRIPT>, <PIN CITE> (2013). 
 88 I have largely avoided the greater and more fact-intensive question whether 
Daubert has indeed resulted in courts exercising greater case management. I consider 
this question somewhat, but only cursorily, infra notes 100-115 and accompanying 
text, in discussing Daubert’s possible differential application in civil and criminal 
cases. 
 89 A possible fourth ground could come this year with the Supreme Court’s 
decision to grant certiorari in Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011), 
cert. granted, 80 USLW 3442 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No. 11-864).  
The Court will consider the question of “whether a district court may certify a class 
action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible 
evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding 
damages on a class-wide basis.” Id. This issue has led to a split in the circuit courts. 
See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a 
district court must consider the merits if they overlap with class certification issues); 
Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a district court 
may resolve disputes going to the factual setting of the case if necessary to the class 
certification analysis). In Wal-Mart Stores Inc., v. Dukes, the Court off-handedly 
addressed this issue stating, “The District Court concluded that Daubert did not apply 
to expert testimony at the certification-stage of class-action proceedings. We doubt 
that is so . . . .” 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553-54 (2011) (citation omitted).  
The lower courts have fundamentally disagreed regarding the required Daubert 
analysis at the class certification stage. Compare In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 612-14 (8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting call to require “a full and 
conclusive Daubert inquiry” at the class certification stage, and concluding that the 
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A. Deference to Trial Court Admissibility Decisions 
If the Supreme Court’s focus had been to improve the scientific 
quality of the judiciary, it would have crafted a rule that included 
appellate courts in the gatekeeping function. This is so for several 
reasons. First, scientific evidence can be complex and difficult and not 
readily handled by busy trial courts. Unlike trial courts, appellate 
courts have both the luxury of time and the luxury of numbers. The 
appellate experience is typically more cerebral and academic, exactly 
the sort of qualities that would best resolve complex scientific 
questions.90 
Another — and perhaps more compelling — reason for inviting 
appellate participation in scientific evidentiary disputes is that many of 
 
“tailored Daubert analysis” used by the district court was sufficient), with American 
Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen an expert’s 
report or testimony is critical to class certification, . . . a district court must 
conclusively rule on any challenge to the expert’s qualifications or submissions prior 
to ruling on a class certification motion. That is, the district court must perform a full 
Daubert analysis before certifying the class if the situation warrants.”). If the Court 
decides, as might be expected given the statement in Dukes, that Daubert applies at the 
certification-stage of class actions, it will constitute an additional ground for the 
conclusion reached in this section — that the Daubert trilogy was meant to further the 
managerial function of trial courts. 
 90 Judge D. Brooks Smith, in a talk on the Y2K litigation in Austin, Texas, related a 
humorous allegory that perfectly captures the different roles of trial, appellate, and 
Supreme Court judges. It follows: 
It seems that there were three members of the federal judiciary who had 
gotten together for a duck hunt: a Supreme Court justice, a member of the 
court of appeals, and a district judge. The trio were warned that in the 
particular venue they had selected the game laws were strictly enforced, and 
that they should take great care to be shooting at the right thing. 
Well, the morning of the hunt arrived, and as the three stood in the duck 
blind, a bird flew from the water to their right. The Supreme Court justice 
stepped forward, raised his shotgun, and pondered, “The question before me 
is to determine first the nature of a duck. This is not simply a question of 
definition; it is an issue of ontological import.” And by the time the justice 
had held forth on the ontology of “duckness,” the bird was gone. 
Then came the appeals court judge, who quickly got a bead on the next bird 
to come off the water, and who, upon seeing it, ruminated, “We assume, of 
course, that all ornithological requirements are met. But to assure that what 
we confront is in fact a duck, we will establish a three-part test. First . . . ” 
Again, by this time, the bird was no longer in sight. Finally, it was the turn 
of the district judge. As soon as he saw something fly within range, he fired 
away, brought down a bird, and exclaimed, “Damn, I hope that was a duck.” 
D. Brooks Smith, The Managerial Judge and Y2K Litigation, 18 REV. LITIG. 403, 404 
(1999). 
FAIGMAN MACRO V2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2013 4:47 PM 
2013] The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity 131 
the controverted issues surrounding applied science are not case 
specific. Indeed, all of the applied science introduced in courts is 
based explicitly or implicitly on general principles or findings that 
transcend particular cases. A toxic tort case, for example, might appear 
to present the question whether Bendectin caused the plaintiff’s birth 
defects. But this determination depends on research that demonstrates 
first of all that Bendectin can sometimes cause birth defects in the 
population. Whether Bendectin causes birth defects is a fact that is not 
particular to an individual case or a specific jurisdiction. Similarly, the 
validity of DNA profiling, firearms identification technology, or 
polygraphs all depend on general research findings. As a matter of the 
logic of scientific discovery, there is absolutely no reason why an 
appellate court should be deferential to a trial court regarding general 
scientific findings. 
In Joiner, however, the Court held that the ordinary standard — 
“abuse of discretion” — that applies to trial court evidentiary rulings 
“should apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude 
expert testimony under Daubert.”91 There was no mention of the 
differences between scientific evidence and ordinary evidence, and no 
discussion of any benefit to courts’ use of science by having appellate 
participation in this review. 
Even more telling than the standard settled upon in Joiner are the 
statements regarding appellate deference in Kumho Tire. The key issue 
in Kumho Tire was whether the gatekeeping obligations of Daubert 
extended to non-scientific — i.e., “technical or other specialized” — 
evidence. The Court ruled that it did, but this holding meant that 
courts would have to identify the global criteria by which to measure 
the validity of experts who are not “scientists,” such as historians, real 
estate appraisers, economists, and accountants. This result is the sort 
of meta-consideration on which a scientifically sensible jurisprudence 
might seek appellate court input. The Kumho Tire Court, however, 
came to the opposite conclusion, again investing broad discretionary 
authority in trial courts. The Court explained its reasoning as follows: 
The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding 
how to test an expert’s reliability, and to decide whether or 
when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to 
investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or 
not that expert’s relevant testimony is reliable. Our opinion in 
Joiner makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply an abuse-
of-discretion standard when it “review[s] a trial court’s 
 
 91 Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997). 
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decision to admit or exclude expert testimony.” That standard 
applies as much to the trial court’s decisions about how to 
determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion. Otherwise, 
the trial judge would lack the discretionary authority needed 
both to avoid unnecessary “reliability” proceedings in ordinary 
cases where the reliability of an expert’s methods is properly 
taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in 
the less usual or more complex cases where cause for 
questioning the expert’s reliability arises. Indeed, the Rules 
seek to avoid “unjustifiable expense and delay” as part of their 
search for “truth” and the “jus[t] determin[ation]” of 
proceedings. Thus, whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or 
are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case 
is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to 
determine.92 
The trial court under Kumho Tire thus largely determines both what 
criteria are used to test reliability and whether the expert’s testimony 
meets those criteria. Moreover, the Court highlighted the fact that this 
broad delegation of authority is tailored, at least in part, to avoiding 
unjustifiable expense and delay. 
The Supreme Court’s insistence that trial courts have broad 
discretion over what factors are used to determine reliability as well as 
the judgment over whether the proffered testimony is reliable, invest 
them with considerable authority to manage these cases. As the Kumho 
Tire Court made clear, this authority ensures that judges have the 
“discretionary authority” to hold or dispense with “appropriate 
proceedings,” as they see fit.93 And, importantly, these judgments can 
be informed by the objective of avoiding “unjustifiable expense and 
delay,” though the ultimate objective is the “search for ‘truth’” and the 
“jus[t] determination” of proceedings.94 “Truth,” it might be argued, 
would be more likely to be advanced by having appellate courts 
participate in the process of resolving disputed scientific evidence. 
Such a process, however, would surely be inimical to avoiding 
“expense and delay.” 
 
 92 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152-53 (1999) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 93 Id. at 152. 
 94 Id. at 152-53. 
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B. The Daubert Trilogy, Weisgram, and Summary Dispositions 
Toward the end of its Daubert opinion, the Court observed that “in 
the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence 
presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable 
juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the 
court remains free to direct a judgment . . ., and likewise to grant 
summary judgment.”95 On remand, the Ninth Circuit held, as a matter 
of law, that the evidence did not pass muster under Daubert and 
directed a verdict for the defendant.96 
The other two legs of the trilogy ended similarly. Although the 
Joiner Court found that there remained open questions necessitating 
remand for further proceedings, the Court’s affirmance of the district 
court’s principal ruling finding that the plaintiff’s experts’ testimony 
was inadmissible effectively ended the case.97 In Kumho Tire, the trial 
court had excluded the plaintiff’s expert and granted the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment, a ruling affirmed by the Supreme 
Court. 
The case that most supports the hypothesis that Daubert and its 
progeny were intended to serve case management needs of trial courts 
is, ironically, the one case in which an appellate court’s management 
was affirmed. As noted above, the trial court in Weisgram admitted 
plaintiffs’ three experts on the question of whether a home heater had 
been defective and caused the fire. The jury returned a verdict for the 
plaintiffs. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting the plaintiffs’ experts. The circuit 
court, however, then held as a matter of law that the expert opinion 
was inadmissible and then remanded and ordered the district court to 
enter judgment for defendant. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the 
circuit court erred when it granted judgment as a matter of law to the 
defendant after excluding the plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony. The 
Weisgram Court disagreed. The Court held “that the authority of 
courts of appeals to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law 
extends to cases in which, on excision of testimony erroneously 
admitted, there remains insufficient evidence to support a jury’s 
verdict.”98 
 
 95 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 96 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 97 A subsequent history search on Westlaw indicated that the Eleventh Circuit 
remanded the case pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling, but there are no 
subsequent reports from the trial court at present. 
 98 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 540, 457 (2000). 
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Although it is a set of only four cases, it can hardly be a coincidence 
that all four of the Court’s major expert evidence cases ended with the 
exclusion of the proffered expertise and summary disposition on the 
merits. This exclusion is not to suggest, of course, that the Court 
intends to erect insurmountable barriers to complex litigation 
involving substantial expert testimony. But the Court has complete 
control of its docket and is reputed to select cases with one eye on 
their convenience for reaching particular outcomes and the other on 
the messages that will be sent.99 Daubert, Joiner, Kumho Tire, and 
Weisgram, were, by this measure, all of a kind. They each contained 
relatively weak expert evidence in which close inspection of their 
scientific premises led to their exclusion, followed by summary 
judgment. The message seems fairly clear. 
C. Do the Rigors of Daubert Apply Equally to Criminal Cases? 
Rule 702 does not distinguish between civil and criminal cases and 
so its dictates should apply equally in the two contexts.100 And courts 
have so held.101 Yet, all of the action in the Supreme Court, from 
Daubert to Weisgram, has been on the civil side of the docket. If the 
issue is simply one of scientific sophistication, Daubert should play out 
similarly in civil and criminal cases. However, if Daubert is principally 
about case management, we should expect substantial differences in 
these two areas. The idea of the managerial judge is largely limited to 
civil cases. Once again, though the evidence is not conclusive, lower 
 
 99 See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-five 
Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1707 (2000) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court does not so much grant certiorari to particular cases, but rather to particular 
questions.”); see generally SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE 
SUPREME COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS (1986) 
(introducing a managerial model of the Supreme Court’s case selection process); H.W. 
PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
(1994) (examining the case selection process from 1976 to 1980 through interviews 
with Justices and their clerks). 
 100 This section of the Essay draws significantly from the discussion in FAIGMAN ET 
AL., supra note 6, at 114-17. 
 101 See United States v. Bahena, 223 F.3d 797, 808 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Daubert does 
apply to criminal cases.”); see also United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 114-
15 (D. Mass. 2010) (“While most of the [listed] cases [involving fire experts] are civil, 
it cannot be that science is different in criminal cases than in civil ones. Bad science is 
bad science; unreliable methodologies are unreliable methodologies, no matter the 
side of the docket.”). 
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courts at least appear to take their gatekeeping duties more seriously 
in managing civil cases.102 
Social scientists have increasingly raised the issue whether courts, in 
fact, employ Daubert more lackadaisically in criminal trials — 
especially in regard to prosecution evidence — than in civil cases, 
especially in regard to plaintiffs’ evidence. This allegation is a serious 
charge. Early research, however, lends some credence to it. Several 
studies have examined the patterns of admissibility decisions in cases 
decided prior to and after the adoption of Daubert, casting at least 
some light on the behavior of both federal and state courts in several 
categories of cases.103 Comparisons of the rate of pretrial challenges to 
the admissibility of expert evidence before and following Daubert 
found a marked increase overall.104 But, in the civil arena, Risinger 
found nearly ninety percent of the challenges being raised by 
defendants against plaintiffs’ expert evidence. Among the criminal 
cases, where the overwhelming bulk of expert evidence is offered by 
the government, defendants are far less active in bringing challenges, 
often failing to raise objections that would have been reasonable and 
available, and which presumably would have been raised in a civil case 
involving evidence with similarly weak foundations. Of the challenges 
to expert evidence brought in federal courts, fewer than ten percent 
were in criminal cases. Of those, the prosecution brought more 
challenges to defense evidence than vice-versa by a ratio of seven to 
two, though the government presents the far larger target for attack.105 
Given that a challenge is mounted, what is the response of the 
courts? In civil cases, the answer is that the post-Daubert courts are 
more likely to exclude challenged expert evidence than they had been 
before. Dixon & Gill found exclusion of challenged expert evidence to 
 
 102 This appears to be the general view among academic writers. See Donald E. 
Shelton, Forensic Science Evidence and Judicial Bias in Criminal Cases, 49 NO. 3 JUDGES’ 
J. 18, 19-20, 24 (Summer 2010); see also Elizabeth L. DeCoux, The Admission of 
Unreliable Expert Testimony Offered by the Prosecution: What’s Wrong with Daubert and 
How to Make it Right, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 131, 132-33 (2007); Jennifer L. Groscup et 
al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal 
Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 346 (2002); Wes R. Porter, Repeating, 
Yet Evading Review: Admitting Reliable Expert Testimony in Criminal Cases Still Depends 
Upon Who Is Asking, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 48, 49 (2009); D. Michael Risinger, 
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the 
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 109-12 (2000).  
 103 See DeCoux, supra note 102; Risinger, supra note 102. 
 104 See Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert 
Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
251, 298 (2002); Risinger, supra note 102, at 102-05.  
 105 Risinger, supra note 102, at 109-10. 
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result about fifty percent of the time pre-Daubert, rising to as much as 
seventy percent in years post-Daubert.106 In Krafka et al.’s surveys 
conducted both before and after Daubert, federal judges reported 
excluding or limiting challenged expert evidence twenty-five percent 
of the time pre-Daubert compared to forty-one percent of the time 
post-Daubert.107 But as between plaintiffs and defendants, the data 
reveal a notable lack of symmetry. Risinger found that defendants 
succeeded about two-thirds of the time in the many federal cases in 
which they challenged plaintiff experts.108 In the smaller set of cases 
where plaintiffs challenged defense-proffered expertise, the challenges 
succeeded less than half the time.109 This pattern was repeated on 
appeal.110 In state civil cases, Risinger found that challenges by 
plaintiffs and by defendants succeeded at about the same forty percent 
rate, but of course defendants were more active in bringing challenges 
(eighty-two percent of the challenges on appeal were by 
defendants).111 A reading of the cases confirms that courts have 
become more aggressive in their scrutiny and exclusion of evidence in 
civil cases. 
On the criminal side, the picture is quite different. Risinger found 
that, post-Daubert, defense challenges to government evidence 
succeeded less than ten percent of the time in federal district courts.112 
Government challenges to defense evidence succeeded two-thirds of 
the time. On appeal, defense-proffered expertise was found to have 
been properly excluded eighty-three percent of the time.113 
Prosecution-proffered expertise that had been admitted at trial was 
excluded only once on appeal. Defendants did somewhat better in 
state courts than in federal courts, winning a quarter of their 
challenges.114 Prosecution challenges to defense expertise succeeded 
about three-quarters of the time.115 
 
 106 Dixon & Gill, supra note 104, at 225. 
 107 Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns 
Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 322 
(2002).  
 108 See Risinger, supra note 102, at 110.  
 109 See id.  
 110 See id. 
 111 See id. at 111.  
 112 See id. at 108.  
 113 See id.  
 114 See id. at 111.  
 115 See id. Groscup et al.’s data (criminal cases drawn from federal appellate courts) 
suggest that patterns of admission and exclusion are unchanged from before Daubert 
to after, and that this pattern holds true for each category of expert testimony 
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“Of course, none of this,” Risinger notes, “goes directly to the 
validity of any given decision,’’ but the data ‘‘are fairly striking in their 
own right.”116 One possibility is that the differences between civil and 
criminal cases reflect meaningful differences in science being used or 
its application to the different groups of cases, and that there are 
systematic differences between the factual issues that arise in civil and 
criminal cases. Or, perhaps, the differential outcomes are attributable 
to differences in the quality of advocacy (borne of differences in 
resources) in the two realms. On the other hand, some commentators 
suggest that social and political differences easily explain the 
differential treatment: that, as a general proposition, judges disfavor 
civil plaintiffs and criminal defendants and are more likely to rule 
against them than against their opposites even when presenting 
equivalent evidence or arguments. A more definitive explanation of 
the pattern awaits future research. 
CONCLUSION 
History will one day record definitively the revolutionary character 
of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Daubert fundamentally 
altered the perspective by which courts evaluate the admissibility of 
expert testimony. Under the Ancien Régime of Frye v. United States, 
courts merely assessed whether the basis for scientific evidence was 
generally accepted in the particular field from which it came. This test 
demanded little scientific sophistication, and courts rarely evidenced 
any sophistication in applying it. Daubert, in contrast, requires courts 
to assess the methods and principles underlying proffered expertise. 
The validity test of Daubert thus places a considerable onus on trial 
court judges to understand basic principles of statistics and scientific 
research methods.117 To be sure, courts have yet to adequately fulfill 
 
examined. Much of the difference between the conclusions of this study and that of 
the others is probably attributable to the universe of cases on which it focused. 
Specifically, the findings reflect the behavior of the courts in the body of cases 
examined. As Groscup et al. realize, by focusing on appellate cases, they are missing 
most of the action (or inaction) at the trial court level. The only trial rulings their 
selection method captures are those that resulted in appeal, meaning cases in which 
defendants lost Daubert challenges followed by losing their trials. On the other hand, 
their method allows them to see more precisely how the decisions of appellate courts 
compare to the decisions of trial courts on the same cases. Jennifer Groscup et al., 
supra note 102, at 342-44 (2002). 
 116 See Risinger, supra note 102, at 108. 
 117 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (quoting Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)) (“[Daubert] imposes a special 
obligation upon a trial judge to ‘ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . . is not 
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this obligation. Indeed, the Daubert revolution will not be fully 
realized until they do. 
Although Daubert’s revolutionary character lies principally in 
altering the intellectual preconceptions of Frye’s Ancien Régime, this 
was probably not the Supreme Court’s intention. Instead, this Essay 
argues that the Court had a somewhat more modest and more 
pedestrian intention. Specifically, close consideration of Daubert and 
its progeny indicates that the Court’s principal objective was to 
empower trial courts to better control their dockets. The cases of 
Daubert, Joiner, Kumho Tire, and Weisgram all support the thesis that 
the Court invoked a validity test for expert opinion testimony in order 
to improve trial courts’ ability to manage cases. 
Still, whatever the original motivation the Court might have had for 
setting forth a validity test for expert evidence, the shift in perspective 
of this new test fundamentally transformed legal practice. Daubert was 
decided on June 28, 1993. Although we are twenty years into the 
revolution, it still remains too early to say just how much has changed. 
Yet everything is different. 
 
 
only relevant, but reliable.’”). 
